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Anthropology of law: Some preliminary thoughts
. on its development
N.ROULAND

We have to consider that the anthropology of law is based on two main topics:
law is not an island among the ocean of various means of social regulations
along the different systems of values and ideologies

and

all societies have law : not only European societies, but the others, including
stateless societies, and societies which have been colonized by Western Countries.
We can add that if every society has law, it doesn't give the same importance to law,
and that mainly depends on its religious beliefs.

We can reswne these ideas in one sentence: the anthropology of law is based on the
discovery of the relativity of the contents of law, and relativity in the ways of thinking
about law.
About the history of this discipline, we can distinguish three periods: before the 19th
century; from the 1861 to World War I; World War I until to the present.

A. Before

19th century: a long tunnel

It is "a long tunnel", because there are few lights on Western countries (but not in
Muslim ones) during this very long period.
Indeed, traditionally law has been regarded by Europeans as an absolute and
autonomous entity, independent of space and time, unconnected in any particular way
with the nature of the society in which it exists. The doctrine of "Natural Law"
constitutes the most elaborate philosophical form of this legal conception. Originating in
Ancient Greece, it assumed that human nature, and therefore the human mind too, was the
same all over the world. Human nature was regarded as highly rational, just, moral and
social. This philosophy, which dominated European legal thought well into the 19th
century, left little room for conceiving of law as a dynamic phenomenon, and prevented
legal scholars from theorizing about legal change. But we can cite two main exceptions:

The Sophists, and Montesquieu.
For the Sophists of Ancient Greece, and specially Protagoras (5th B.C.), the
definitions of just and unjust don't depend on nature but on law. And Law depend on
the grounds which have the power in a society, it does not depend mainly on Reason,
as Plato and Aristotle wrote. That is a way to say that Law is relative.
Many centuries later, Montesquieu challenged the basic tenets of Natural Law by
presenting a radically different conceptualization of law and society. His impact on
Western jurisprudence was so great that Durkheim Wrote: "It is Montesquieu who
first laid down the fundamental principles of social science" and "instituted a new
field of study, which we now call comparative law"l (I can add that if comparative

1.

E. Durkheim, Montesquieu and Rosseau: Forerunners of sociology (Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 1960),61,51.
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law had not become too ethnocentrist a science, we would not needed now an
anthropology of law ... ). Indeed, Montesquieu realised that law in a given society
was not a reflection of a universally valid set of legal principles. but rather an .
integral part of a particular people's culture. It was closely related to the people's
constitution, to the type of government, the political and military fields, and to the
other institutions existing in a particular society. For him, there are five basic types
of societies with corresponding legal systems: the savage and the barbaric possess a
political structure and a weak legal system, without clearly defmed sovereign power;
the monarchic, republican and despotic societies have a clearly defined sovereign
power, and the power of law is increasing in these types of societies. Montesquieu
insists on another point, very important for modem anthropology of law; he thinks
that the legal system of a nation cannot be easily transplanted into another society.
He writes" Laws should be so proper to the people for which they are made that it is
very great accident if those of one nation may suit another." Only in rare cases does
Montesquieu admit a possibility of transplantation of law: when the institutions of
donor and those of the recipient society are the same. This is very important because
that is now a main topic for anthropoligists of law; the acculturation of law. We
have a lot of examples of the introduction of Western law in non-Western societies:
German law in Japan, the Common Law in India, Dutch law in Indonesia, French
law in black Africa, and so on. Very often the result is that the official law is not the
people's law. Anthropologists of law use the various theories of legal pluralism to
try to understand these phenomena. But legal pluralism is a 20th century view of
legal world. During the century after Montesquieu, scholars didn't think in the terms
of pluralism, but of evolution, jurists as well as the others.

B. The 19th century: faith

in evolution and progress

The 19th century seems to be the triumph of western countries: the industrial
revolution, laicization of the ideas, colonization, and so on. Western countries
thought themselves to be at the top in terms of evolution and of progress. Scholars
imagined that other countries were ranked on a scale of evolution, some of the these
societies, like the black African ones, being very low on this scale. Oriental and
Indian countries had a better image, but they represented a phase of evolution which
Western countries had gone beyond. Therefore, colonization was right all societies
were submitted to the same laws of development, and colonization was a good way to
progress more quickly.
Jurists produced a general elaboration of these evolutionary ideas. For example, they
thought that all societies went from an extended to a nuclear family; from collective
to private ownership; from status to contract; from feud to state punishment, and so
on. And I fear that even nowadays, most of them continue to belive in these
postulates.
But, in spite of these mistakes, the 19th century saw the birth of the anthropology of
law. I can give you the exact date of this birth: 1861 (eighteen hundred and sixty
one). During this year two books were published. First a book by a German speaking
Swiss judge: J. Bachofen. Das Mutterrecht. Bachofen intended to prove that at the
beginning of mankind, all societies were matriarchal. Nowadays, few authors can
agree with him. But the great contribution of Bachofen concerns methodology.
Contrary to most of jurists of his time-may
be of our time-he
thought that law
must be sought not only in written texts and Roman law, but also in myths,
legends, the history of art, and so on ... This is a very important point for the study
of law in a non-literate society, but also in contemporary western societies (for
example, we can ask why, in France, most of law codes are published with a red

Anthropology

of law: Some preliminary thoughts on its development

99

cover, why judges in trials and referees in football matches wear black suit and so on

.. ).

The second book published in eighteen hundred and sixty one is Ancient Law. written
by H. Summer-Maine. And here we reach India: Sir Henry Sumner-Maine, like many
western people in that time, was fascinated by India, and by the law of Indo-European
people.
Sir H. Sumner-Maine (1822-1888) was Regius Professor of Civil law in Cambridge,
reader in Roman law at the Inns of Court, Professor of Jurisprudence in Oxford, and
Professor of international law in Cambridge. But he spent several years in India,
because he loved this country very much, and thought that "it was one of the greatest
reserve in the world of ancient customs and ancient legal ideas which scholars could
test in their time." For example, in the Studies on History of Law. he wrote: "If we
imagine an ancient society as a society in which we can find customs and legal ideas
which are not the same, but similar to some kinds phenomena which belong to the
past of our western world, we can say that there are in the Orient plenty of vestiges
of the ancient society. Among these vestiges. the most instructive. because easy to·
observe, arein India. "1
He was a member of the Council of General Governor, and until his death, member
of the Council of State Secretary for India, he was vice-chancellor of the University of
Calcutta for three years, and created the legislative department of the Government of India,
which prepared laws for all of India, with Sir John Lawrence, a great Indian administrator.
In this sense he was a man who went in the filed and did not remain only in European
libraries, even if he did not escape excessive and too abstract generalizations (like his
thesis of evolution from status to contract), because he lived as a notable does, not really
as field explorer, like B. Malinowski or others anthropologists.
Sir H. Sumner-Maine thought that he was in India at the crucial time: the time in
which the various different parental and cost communities in India were dissolving, and on
the point of being transformed into a large territorial nation-state. For him, the role of the
English government was to make this evolution easier, and to keep what was good in
ancient customs, and leave what was obsolete, and replace it by borrowing English legal
ideas. While he was a member of council of General Governor, 209 (two hundred and
nine) bills were passed, which he prepared and controlled himself. For him, modem
legislation had to give more freedom to Hindu society. He wrote in this sense: "If we
judge by experience. there is no limitation to the influence a clear and simple legal
system can exercise by absorbing the less developed systems." As you can see, Maine did
not fear value judgements: it was normal for an evolutionist. ..
For example, abo.ut the bill on marriage, he criticized the habit of English judges to
validate the prescriptions of the Hindu legal system which forbade the marriage between
members of different casts. About land law, he was more conservative. He intervened
several times in the discussions about occupancy tenures of Punjab, and said that land law
was one of the most important bases of the Indian society, and that it was unrealistic and
dangerous to think of modifying it too rapidly.
From a general point of view, one can say that his "Ancient Law" made an impact on
English and world jurisprudence comparable to the effect of Freud on psychology, or
Durkheim on sociology. He rejected the philosophy of Natural Law, and insisted on an
empirical recognition of differences in legal systems of the various peoples.
At the time of Maine's writing, the impact of biological evolutionary
1.

H. Sumner-Maine, Eludes

SIlT

I'hisloire dw droit

(paris, E. Thorio, 1889),21.

theory upon
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science was so intense that it was logical to try to extend it to the felted of social
relations. Therefore, he did not escape casting his theory in an evolutionist form,
postulating the existence of stages of social development common to the various human
societies he studied, linked with stages of development of law and legal ideas.
He started with the "archaic society", dominated by the extended family, a patrilineal
and patriarchal community, which he saw in old Roman, Hebrew, and Hindu
civilizations, and in Irish law. For Maine, this archaic society had no law. Law was not
present even in the early part of the second evolutionary stage, the tribal state. The Tribal
state appeared when family groups were brought together, always on the basis of the
belief that the tribal chiefs descended from a single male ancestor. Law began when,
within the tribal state, chiefs of the late tribal societies pronounced the same judgements
in similar situations, and created a set of abstract principles: custom, and no longer
Themis, became the source and content of the earliest law. As evolution progressed, we
reached the next stage: the common territory, which emerged as unifying societal
principle, in addition to that of kin relationship (actual and fictive). This stage was linked
with the natural growth of the number of tribesmen, or to the merger of several tribal
groups either by incorporation of one into another on the basis of adoption, or by
absolute subjugation of one by the other. The fiction of common descent slowly gave
way to the new unifying social principle, the ideal of coherence that went with occupation
of a common territory. We are now really in the kingdom of law, and law began to be
differentiated from ethics and religion. Writing was invented, custom was written in the
early legal codes. From this stage, Maine thought that human societies were divided in
two major types:
those that retarded progress and became more or less stationary
a few others-in
fact the Western societies-that
moved on and become
"progressive." These modem societies were to dissolve family dependency and to
insist on the individual obligation: it is the passage from status to contract (verbal
contract, then written, then real, then consensual).
That is fine theory, but now we know that on many accounts it is only a theory.
Data about primitive societies, which were not available to Maine at the time he wrote,
disclose that his patriarchal conception of primitive society, his idea of a complete lack of
territorial bond among the tribal people, his assumption that in the primitive society
there are no rights and duties for the individual, his belief i:1 the passage from status to
contract. What would have happened if Maine had lived long enough to have had at his
disposal the results of twentieth century ethnological research? We can ask the same
question about the other evolutionist scholars who followed Maine, until World War I.
They were mainly German.
The last three decennaries of nineteenth century constitute the epoch of German
domination of anthropology of law.
The first name to be remembered is the title of a German review, which is published
till today: the Zeitschrift fur vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft. The first issue was
published in 1878 (eighteen hundred and seventy eight). This review was directed by
Bernhoeft, Kohn and above all, Joseph Kohler. The founders' aim was to build a
general theory of the evolution of legal systems: not only Roman and European
systems, but also others. But the accent was put mainly on written laws, not on oral
systems and customs. From 1883 (eighteen hundred and eighty three) Kohler was the
main leader of the review. Progressively, the geographical field of countries studied
by the authors of the Zeitschrift became larger; Eastern European countries, India,
oriental countries and the last, because not well-known, black Africa. Ancient Roman
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law was progressively abandoned.
The second name to be remembered is Post. His Ethnologische Jurisprudenz
was
published in 1893 (eighteen hundred and ninety three). He was really an encyclopedist
of the 19th century: he studied all the legal systems of all the societies \ 'hich were
known in Europe in this time. He was a strict evolutionist author. But like most of
the scholars of his epoch, he never went in the field. About this attitude, I can tell
you a short story. Sir James Frazer was a very gre,at specialist of religion in
traditional societies. He wrote a lot of very good books about this subject. At the end
of his life, someone asked him "have you ever seen one of these savages you study
so perfectly in your books?". He answered: "Thank God, never!" 20th century
Anthropologists would react against such an attitude.

C. 20th

century:

field-work

The. methodology of anthropology underwent important changes at the beginning of
the 20th century. Just let me try to resume the main characteristics of this century in this
regard.
The first point is the decline of general theory, and peculiarly of evolutionism.
Ethnographic data show more and more that many facts contradict the ideas of the
foundators of anthropology of law. There is not one evolution, but certainly several
types of evolution, or even no evolution at all. Moreover, new .theories don't give an
important role to historical explanation and to dynamic change. The functionalists
conceived to societies they study as all ordered and closed groups, which don't want to
change, and change little. One can note the' same indifference about history
structuralism in. For the structuralist authors, the main factor is the mechanism of
the human mind, determined by the brain.
The second point is the importance of field-work in anthropology. To study legal
systems of non-western societies, it is now necessary for the scholars to go and
remain inside these concrete societies: it is a better way to know them than to study
them only through books. Therefore, there are two conditions in the 20th century for
a country to have a good anthropology:
(1) To have a field, that is to have colonies, like most Western Countries, or to have
ethnic minorities, like the United Sta'tes and Canada (Indians and Eskimoes).
(2) To have an intellectual tradition oriented towards the study of anthropology of law.
It is necessary to have both of these conditions. One can give several examples:
(1) Germany dominated anthropology of law at the end of the 19th century.
Nowadays, this country has completely forgotten its prestigious past in this science
for two reasons. First, the Versailles Treaty took away all Germany's colonies (and
because the politics of Bismark, who was not interested by a colonial empire).
Anyway, Germany had few colonies. Second, nazism: studies about "inferior races"
became dangerous, and many anthropologists of law who were Jewish had to leave
Germany.
(2) Spain and Portugal had a large colonial empire. But the scientists were not
interested in anthropology of law. Therefore, there are no works in this science.
(3) The same thing in Continental Europe. In Italy, anthropology of law was
studied only during the short time of Italian colonies in Africa. In France, jurists
were not interested in anthropology, and anthropologists were not interested in law.
But there is one great exception: the Netherlands. TheNetherlands is paradise for an
anthropologist of law: not only did the country have a large empire in Indonesia, but
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also many very good authors, since the turn of the century, were interested
anthropology of law.

in

(4) About Great Britain, the United States and Canada. conditions were very
good: there was a vast colonial empire (Great Britain) or ethnic minorities (the States
and Canada), and a lot of great authors. Their main theoretical orientation was
functionalist, not marxist or structuralist. Now~ the anthropology of law is rather
weak in Great Britain. But it is very strong in Canada and United States: a large
majority of authors are American or Canadian, and the English language is very
dominant in this science. Paradoxically, anthropology of law has until now been a
luxury of rich countries. whereas it has been built on the non-western societies. In
the third world, some countries are now interested, but many of them suspect this
science, because they fear that it would be a vehicle for ethnic identity movements,
dangerous for nation-state. I don't agree at all with this pint of view because I think
that the real mistake is to try to suffocate the manifestations of ethnic identity. When
governments begin to do that, several years later, you are sure to have violent and
aggressive manifestations of ethnic identity, and the problem at this time is very
difficult to solve.

The methodology
A.

of the anthropology

of law .

The pioneers
As you know, jurists, lawyers and judges explore books better than jungles or
deserts. The great scholars of the 19th century read accounts by missionaries,
travellers, administrators and so on, who had a peculiar point of view, often
ethocentrist, about the populations they met. And the idea, for a scholar, to go in the
field was considered as completely crazy, and synonymous of a great waste of time: it
was not the work of an anthropologist. At that time, anthropologist and historians
were as one.
The first great scholar to give up this attitude was Bronislaw Malinowski. He was
born in 1884 (eighteen hundred and eighty four) in Cracow, in the Austrian Empire.
He was doing scientific research in Australia, when world War I began. He was put in
Jail because he was an enemy alien, but he pleaded with the authorities to be sent to
New-Guinea and the Trobriand Island, a region almost unknown at this time. The
Australians said "O.K." and Malinowsky remained there several years. His scientific
work is very important, and he wrote about law (crime and custom in savage
society): he was opposed to Maine's theory of status to contract, and thought that the
basis of law was not repression but reciprocity.
The other name is a German. a very great anthropologist of law: Richard Thurnwald
(1869-1954) eighteen hundred and sixty nine-nineteen
hundred and fifty four).
Thumwald was born in Vienna, and obtained a doctorate as a jurist He did his first
ethnographic fieldwork in the service of the Austrian administration of Bosnia from
1896 (eighteen hundred and ninety six). In 1901 (nineteen hundred and one) he went
to Berlin where he was made assistant curator at the Berlin Ethnographic Museum. In
this capacity he travelled from 1906-1909 (nineteen hundred and six-to nine) in the
German colonies in Micronesia and Melanesia. The results of this fieldwork were
published in the Zeitschrift fur vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft. He undertook a
second field trip, to German New Guinea (Kaiser Wilhelms Land), towards the end of
1912 (nineteen hundred and twelve). The German imperial colonial office asked him
to penetrate into the interior of this island, following the Sepik river to its up to then
unknown middle and upon reaches. After the outbreak of World War I, Thumwald
stayed in New Guinea until 1915 (nineteen hundred and fifteen). His studies were
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mainly concerned with kinship and social structure. They also involved the legal
aspects of the complicated two-class kinship system which he (Thurnwald) analysed.
ThurnWald stressed the importance of ethnographic fieldwork because, in order to
explore the functional interdependencies of law with all other aspects of life, the
researcher had to observe the ways of acting and thinking of the people themselves
being studied. Since the time, fieldwork has become indispensable for the formation
of an anthropologist, jurist or not.
The factual point of view is peculiarly important in the anthropology of law, because
there is no system of abstract principles of law in many traditional societies.
Moreover, these societies, are most of the time non-literate, therefore you have no
legal texts, no codes, and so on. One can say that often myths have a legislative
function. But a great part of the legal system consists in oral customs, which are not
easy to discover. According to these facts, all the 20th century anthropology of law,
specially the English speaking scholars, has been dominated by the study of the
regulations of conflicts, because the conflict is a privileged occasion to discover the
"living Law". I can give a concrete example. If I ask a Cheyenne Indian "What is the
rule in case of adultery?" he will probably answer: "I don't know .... But years ago,
when my uncle took his friend's wife, the elders decided to arrange the dispute in the
following way ... (and so on)."
B.

Principles

of

methodology

To conclude on this point of methodology, I suggest these principles which French
anthropologists try to follow:
(a) to study the legal discourses (oral or written), that is the legal norms. For
example, the civil or penal codes. All law students do that. But the problem lies in
their tendency to do only that ...
(b) to study the practice of law. Does the practice follow the principles of law, in
what proportion when, where, why and so on? That is very important not only for
the anthropologist, but also for the anthropologis~ of law.
(c) to study the system of values, or representations from which the law is derived.
This is more important for anthropologists than for the sociologist of law, or for the
classical jurist. Because of his opposition to jurist or sociologist, the anthropologist
has also to study societies which are not that to which he belongs. Therefore, he has
to understand the beliefs to these societies. For example, to understand the matrilineal
kinship of Dogons, you have to know the Dogon myths of the creation of the world.
More and more frequently the anthropologist, by end of 20th century, study not only
non-western societies, but their own societies as well. This is a growing filed in
anthropology of law ..
It is a common place to say that the world has changed since the beginning of this
century. But it is a fact. Among these changes, two seem to me very important for our
subject. First, the end of western territorial colonization, and the creation of new nationstates, which inherited many things-especially
concepts of law-from
the western
nations. Second, the continuing influence of the western culture, by various means, on
many non-western countries. Specially in black Africa, the westernisation of official law
has increased since Independences ... But this phenomenon is not the same allover the
world: certain muslim states are strongly opposed to western law and culture.
What are the consequences of these changes on the anthropology of law? I can give
you my personal opinion. I can resume it in one sentence: another ethnology was born;
anthropology, in the sense of a universal theory of man, is beginning. Let me try to give
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you some explanations about these two themes.

A. The birth of another ethnology

of law

We can define ethnology as the study of particular societies, most of the time nonwestern and colonized societies, which were studied in their stage just before colonization,
a golden-age for a many ethnologist. ... Now, this type of study is always possible, but
in fact it is not ethnology, nor anthropology but history. Because of the 20th Century's
changes, that is in great part the past, to varying degrees. For example, the way of life of
the Inuit now is nearer to that of Canadians or the Danes than it is to hunter-fishercollectors ... In other parts of world, the gap between traditional and present times is not
great, but it exists in any case. And if you want to study the traditional way of life, most
of the time your work will be that of a historian.
But there is a new ethnology: this one studies the changes occurring in the 20th
century, it studies acculturation. There are many topics in the field of law. For example,
we study the passage from an oral legal system to a written law; the mechanisms of
codifications which often in black Africa copied the codifications and constitutions of
Europe (western Europe, or Eastern European countries); the transformations of kinship
(passage from matrilinear to patrilinear or non-differentiated descent); the transformations
of land ownership, and so on ... In black Africa, a new field consists in the so-called
"politics of legal authenticity." Certain African states think now that they have gone too
far in copying European legislation. Therefore, they try to elaborate new legislation, in
which traditional and modern legal systems are mixed (family law in Zaire, laws
concerning inheritance to Togo, and so on .... ).
Another problem, in my opinion, belongs to this new legal ethnology. It is the
problem of ethnic minorities: We must remember that in all the world, 200 million
individuals belong to ethnic minorities. These can constitute parts of western countries
(for example Indian, Eskimos, Lapps, Basques, Jewish, Gypsies and so on). But there are
also a lot of ethnic minorities in non-western countries. For example: Touaregs in NorthAfrica, Kurds in Middle-Eastern States, Mea in South-East Asian Countries, Negritos in
the Philippines, Ainus in Japan ... India has a substantial tribal population. The
population of scheduled tribes today is 51 (fifty one) million: more than 200 tribes
speaking more than 100 main languages). Half of the scheduled tribes are concentrated in
three States; Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Bihar.
In these ethnic minorities of India, there are hardly any tribal groups which have not
been exposed to contact and penetration of non-tribal people. The Constitution seeks
to safeguard the cultural unity and identity of tribal groups through provisions in
fundamental rights, autonomous statehood or self-governance institutions, and a
whole variety of limitations on the nefarious activities of the non-tribals, especially
money lenders. At the same time, the Indian State has undertaken a wide range of
tribal development and welfare programmes including land and agrarian reforms. What
are the results?
The situation is so infinitely varied across these communities that it is rash to
generalize. Sometimes the situation is bad; sometimes, like among the Santols of
Bihar, we find autonomy, maintenance of cultural heritage, persistent aspects of tribal
customary law.
The tribal communities

are not above the State law. But for the practical

pUrposes, they are governed by complex regimes of customary law, administered

by

community-dispute
institutions. Variations in these regimes and institutions
people's law is certainly a priority on the agenda of legal anthropology in India.

of
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In general way, we can say that the nonnative and institutional regimes of
people's law vary according to the stage of social and economic development
Nomadicfood-gathering
tribes, like Andaman Islanders or Chenchus of Andhra
Pradesh have simple societies, with rudimentary division of labor, with no
established authority or enforcement of norms. There are not recognizable dispute
institutions: community disapproval of violations of well-established norms provides
the most effective sanctions. Because the fluidity of social units permits the easy
separation of those who cannot agree.
Tribes which practice shifting cultivation. like Reddis of Andhra Pradesh, have a
greater need for social control. In these societies, the emergence of dispute
institutions and mediatory roles is related to common ownership of land, with rights
of cultivation given to the person or group actually clearing the forest and tilling the
land for a period. But there is no centralized and permanent authority or settlement of
disputes: the elders of each community have to form a council in case of serious
breach of customary law.
In other societies, there is less egalitarianism. One accepts or even encourages
differentials in power and wealth. For example, the Apa Tanies, on Indo-Tibetan
borderlands, have developed an highly efficient system of rice cultivation on
permanent irrigated fields. The Apa Tanies recognize private property in land; they
have rigid stratification, with immutable barriers between noblemen and commoners.
Their dispute institutions are formal, and consist in councils which comprise
representatives of each clan of the village. There is a clear distinction between
"public" and "private" wrongs in Apa Tani jurisprudence (theft is a public wrong; for
private disputes, self-help is permitted, councils, intervene only in case of public
wrongs, or when private disputes develop a tendency to affect public peace.
In general. basic institutions like marriage, succession and adoption among the
commWJities statutorily recognised as tribals are guided by their customary law. The
Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Inheritance Act and Hindu Adoption Act which apply to
Hindu and Buddhists do not ordinarily apply even to those tribals who claim
Hinduism as their religion. The Hinduised tribals can be brought within the preview
of these acts only though the issue of a public notification by the competent
authority. Such a modification has not yet been issued in respect of any tribal
community.
Indian Christians are guided in the matter of inheritance by the Indian Succession
Act, 1927, (nineteen hundred and twenty seven). This provides for the exemption
from the Act of Christians belonging to aboriginal communities by the issues of
notifications. A large number of communities were thus exempted before India
obtained its independence from foreign rule, and no exemption has yet been rescinded
for any aboriginal community.
Remember also that in 1874 (eighteen hundred and seventy four), the Scheduled
Districts Act enabled the Government to determine by notification which laws were
to be enforced in Scheduled Districts. Nowadays, institutional arrangements for the
recognition of customary law as complementary to State law exist in their fQllest
form in parts of the Sixth Schedule areas of North-East India. Some of the
Autonomous District Councils and Regional Councils have set up their own courts
to try cases according to the customary law of their communities.
Some
Autonomous District Councils also enacted legislation codifying customary laws in
matters connected with marriage, inheritance, chiefship, community land and so on.
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B. Beginnings

of anthropology

of law

Anthropology is not only the study of certain societies, in certain parts of the world.
Its scope is very much larger, and also very ambitious. It intends to study all the societies
and their legal systems, both non-western societies, and western societies. Through the
cultural variations, it hopes to ftnd general rules concerning law. But nowadays, we are
just at the beginning of this great project, which was the dream of the founders of
anthropology of law, in the 19th century.

a. Anthropology

of western

societies

Theftrst step was the idea that western and modern societies can be also studiedfrom
an anthropological point of view, and by comparison with the result of research in
societies colonized by western peoples. This mental revolution, in my personal
opinion, is the consequence of two facts:
the crisis of western values and
modern life. The westerners, are
civilization is the best one. And
apply to ourselves the research
Ethnology is not only for distant

anguish about the rapid and numerous changes of
not convinced, as our grand-parents were, that our
if it is not necessarily the best one, why don't we
methods which we applied to exotic societies?
societies.

The end of colonization : With this event, it became more and more difficult for
anthropologists
to stay in their traditional field, because, as I said, developing
countries
often don't like anthropology
and anthropologists.
Therefore,
anthropologists had to come back to Europe.
At this time, in the anthropology of law, most research on western societies
concerned the administration of civil and penal justice. For two reasons. First, the
anthropology of law has accumulated many works about the regulation of conflicts in
traditional societies: it is good training, and a great source of examples. Second, in
some occidental countries (the United States, Canada, France), we have seen a great
development of so-called "Informal Justice" procedures, based on mediation,
conciliation, arbitration and so on ... These modes of settlement of disputes are very
common in traditional societies.

b. Legal

pluralism

The second step is the establishment
of a general consensus among the
anthropologist of law (not among the jurists !), about the recognition of the fact of
legal pluralism. Any society, western or non-western, has several legal systems,
which can be official, or non official. It is the classic distinction between the State's
Law and the people's law. Theories of legal pluralism were first applied to colonised
societies, to study the problems ranging from coexistence to conflict between
indigenous law and the colonizer's law. Then they were applied to western societies,
but I must insist on the fact that in western countries, the majority of jurists don't
accept the existence of other legal systems beside---or below-the State's law.
To give you an example of legal pluralism, I can try to give you the example of
India, although I am not at all a specialist of Indian studies ...
First we have to observe that, contrary to Christian, Jewish and Muslim
cultures, Hinduism doesn't believe in Man, with a capital M. For Hindus, there are
various types of men, gathered in social units. The accent is put more on the groups
than on the individuals, and most of the traditional societies share this point of view.
Therefore, law has not to be the same for all men: it all depends on the communities
to which they belong. This is a good basis for recognition of legal pluralism: as
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there are many communities in societies, there are many legal systems in society.
But colonization introduced in India other types of legal pluralism: as there are many
communities in Society, there are legal systems, and this added to the degree of legal
pluralism, official and unofficial. Under the Muslim domination, the customary
Hindu law was not used by judges, who used Muslim law. Under the British
domination, the Hindu legal system became official again, and was put on the same
level as Muslim law. But the British domination had serious disadvantages.
First the Hindu law was often applied in the wrong way, because Englishmen
thought that dharmasastras were the positive law of India, while in fact they represent
an ideal. Moreover, not all dharmasastras have been translated into English, and they
still are not well enough understood; judges gave the precedents and authority which
they did not have in Hindu law.
Second, British domination limited the influence of Hindu law to certain matters:
family, castes, rural law, religious matters, but did not apply it in contracts and
obligations (expect in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta).
Third, under British domination, a territorial system of law began to be created to
manage the relations between different communities. This new type of law was the
Anglo- Indian law, in the presidency towns of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta.
With the Charter Act of 1833 (eighteen hundred and thirty three) began another
period. Codes were made, and great laws passed until the end of the 19th century: aU
this evolution tended to a reception in India of English law, with adaptations to the
specificity of India.
Therefore, one can say that India is a good example of legal pluralism, but also
of mixed law. But I wish to ask a question. In black Africa, official law is stretched
by the influence of European law French, British or Soviet. But in fact, ninety pee
cent of the people apply another law, partly recent non-official law, partly traditional
law. Is a comparison with India possible? What is the exact gap between the State's
law and the people's law? That is one of the main questions of legal pluralism.
Recognition of the legal pluralism, extension of anthropological method to western
societies: those were the two first steps. The third step is the most difficult
c. General

explanations

The third step is to try to find general explanations based on the study of the most
varied ethnological data possible. We are at the beginning of this step, but I can giv~
you two examples.
The first is what I call "the law of social distance". We can observe in all known
societies that when individuals belong to the same community (family, residence,
religious association, and so on), they try to regulate their relations by avoiding
appealing to abstract principles of law, and to judges. A french proverb says: "One
must wash his dirty linen inside the family". In the same sense, a blood feud is
prohibited inside the same group in all the traditional societies; and we know that in
modern nations-states, civil war is considered with horror.
Second is the parallel between religious belief and the concept of law, demonstrated
by M. Alliot, a French anthropologists of law. I can resume very briefly this
parallel:
Asiatic cultures, like traditional China, don't believe in the creation of the world and
man by one God: the universe is eternal and auto-regulated. Like the universe, human
society must regulate itself, by education and rites, not by law and judges. which held
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in contempt (in present China, the great majority of disputes are settled not by
judges, but by mediators).
African cultures (black Africa) belive that one God has created the universe, but that
he is intimately mixed with this world: this is animism. For the Africans, law
exists, but it is less differentiated from ethics and religion than in western societies.
Monotheist cultures (Christian, Jewish, Muslim) think that one God has created the
Universe and Man, and that this God, separated from his creation, intervenes very
directly in the world: either by prophets; or by his own embodiment, Jesus-Christ
We note that these cultures give a high value to law and judgements (cr the "Last
Judgment")
and obey the imperative
conceptions
of law
the "Ten
Commandments" of Moses).

(d

As a conclusion, we can say thatfor all cultures. the c.oncept .of law seems to be a
c.onsequence .of the vari.ous senses which they give t.o the existence .of man and the
Universe.
All this shows us that anthropology of law is not only a legal maUer, but can reach
the philosophic sphere. I hope everyone will be convinced of its utility, specially for the
jurist ; . who is often a philosopher without realizing it

